Abstract-The paper studies algorithms for learning purestrategy Nash equilibria (NE) in networked multi-agent systems with uncertainty. In many such real-world systems, information is naturally distributed among agents and must be disseminated using a sparse inter-agent communication infrastructure. The paper considers a scenario in which (i) each agent may observe their own actions, but may not directly observe the actions of others, and (ii) agents have some uncertainty about the underlying state of the world. In order for an agent to obtain information pertaining to the action history of another, the information must be disseminated through a (possibly sparse) overlaid communication infrastructure. In order to learn purestrategy NE in this setting, the paper studies a general class of learning dynamics based on the Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm which we refer to as inertial best response dynamics. As an application of this general result, the paper subsequently studies distributed implementations of the classical FP algorithm (with inertia), and the Joint Strategy FP (JSFP) algorithm (with inertia) in the above setting. Finally, numerical simulations are provided which verify the findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theoretic learning processes have gained increasing prominence in the control, signal processing, and communication communities due to their applicability as decentralized algorithms (e.g., [1] - [6] ). In these contexts, a multi-agent system is often modeled using the framework of a normalform game [1] , [7] . Pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game can often be shown to represent desirable operating conditions in the associated multi-agent system (e.g. [8] ).
There exist many game-theoretic learning algorithms that ensure agents learn pure NE strategies (e.g., [9] , [10] ). However, such algorithms generally assume that agents have instantaneous access to information necessary to compute their nextstage action. In many real-world scenarios, global information is not instantly available to all agents-rather, information tends to be distributed throughout the system and must be disseminated to all agents using some overlaid communication infrastructure, e.g., wireless networks [2] , [4] , multi-robot systems [8] , smart grid infrastructure [5] , [11] .
In this paper, we consider a setting in which each agent has access to private information about their own action history, but does not have (direct) access to information about the actions of others, nor access to instantaneous payoff information. We assume that agents are endowed with an overlaid communication graph where a vertex represents a player and an edge denotes the ability for two players to exchange information (e.g., see [12] - [16] ). An agent may only obtain information related to another agent's action history if that information is disseminated through the communication graph.
The assumption that players do not have access to payoff information is relevant in settings where feedback from physical game play is not available, or is delayed. This may occur, for example, in scenarios where agents wish to precompute an equilibrium strategy prior to physical game play, or where the designed utility functions do not readily admit physical measurement. In such a framework, information can be subject to corruption and delay as it is disseminated through the communication graph, and the traditional convergence results of pure-strategy-NE seeking algorithms do not apply.
In addition to assuming that information flow is restricted to an inter-agent communication graph, we suppose that agents may have some uncertainty about the state of the world. We model this uncertainty using a game of incomplete information in which players have some uncertainty about the game utility functions. We assume that each player receives a private signal that is correlated to the true (time-invariant) state of the world. Using this information, each agent forms a personal belief about the state of the world, which they may update as information is shared over the communication graph through the course of the learning process. A learning process in this setting must take into account the joint objectives of uncertainty mitigation and pure-strategy NE learning.
In order to learn pure-strategy NE within the framework described above, we consider a broad class of learning dynamics based on the well-known Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm [17] , [18] and demonstrate convergence results within the class of weakly acyclic games [19] .
In particular, we consider a class of algorithms we denote as inertial best response dynamics-such algorithms consist of a best-response component (similar to classical FP) and an additional "inertial term" which ensures that players occasionally repeat actions in consecutive stages. The use of an inertial term is a common technique used to ensure convergence to pure-strategy NE [9] , [10] .
We first prove a general convergence result that applies to any inertial best response algorithm. The general convergence result applies to a broad class of learning dynamics and applies to a wide variety of information dissemination schemes (not just the synchronous graph-based information dissemination schemes that we focus on in the later part of the paper).
Subsequently, as applications of the general result, we study the distributed implementation (under uncertainty) of two important inertial best response algorithms.
As a first application, we study the distributed implementation of classical FP with inertia (referred to as D-FP) (see Section IV).
As a second application, we study the distributed implementation of a variant of the Joint Strategy FP algorithm [9] that is applicable within the class of congestion games. (We refer to distributed algorithm as D-JSFP.) Classical FP can be difficult to implement in large-scale games due to high demands in terms of information overhead and complexity as the number of players grows large. JSFP is a variant of FP that mitigates these issues. We note that while the D-JSFP algorithm of this paper is able to operate with lower computational and communication burdens, it is applicable within a narrower class of games than D-FP. (This is a consequence of the structure of the information that is passed through the network-see Section V for more details.)
In summary, the paper investigates the problem of learning pure-strategy NE in games where there is environmental uncertainty and players must communicate information using an overlaid communication graph. As our first main contribution, we study a general class of learning algorithms that we call inertial best response dynamics, and we prove such algorithms converge to pure-strategy NE under appropriate assumptions. Our second main contribution is an application of this general result to develop variants of the FP and JSFP algorithms that achieve pure-strategy NE learning in distributed settings with uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we set up the problem formulation. In Section III we present the general convergence result for inertial best response dynamics. In Section IV we study distributed implementations of classical FP with inertia. In Section V we study distributed implementations of the Joint Strategy FP algorithm with inertia. In Section VI we present simulation examples.
II. NETWORKED MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In this paper we consider scenarios where players in a game have incomplete information about the state of the world. Formally, we begin by defining Θ to be the set of possible states of the world and we assume that Θ is a metrizable space. We let B(Θ) denote the Borel σ-algebra on Θ and let ∆(Θ) denote the set of probability measures on the measurable space (Θ, B(Θ)). Further use N = {1, . . . , n} to denote the set of players and A i to denote the action space of player i, which we assume to be finite. The joint action space of all the players is then given by the Cartesian product A = n i=1 A i . For each state of the world θ ∈ Θ we consider the associated normal-form game defined by the tuple
where u i (·, θ) : A → R denotes the utility function of player i given the state θ. Observe that the set of players and the set of possible actions are assumed to be the same irrespective of the state of the world θ. When player i chooses strategy a i , the payoff it receives is u i ({a i } i∈N , θ) = u i (a, θ). The payoff depends on the joint action profile a = {a i } i∈N and the state of the world θ. We suppose that players are permitted to use probabilistic strategies. Formally, let the mixed strategy space of player i be given by the set ∆(A i ) of probability distributions over A i and let ∆ n (A) := n i=1 ∆(A i ) denote the set of joint mixed strategies where it is assumed that players use independent strategies. We represent a joint mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆ n (A) as the n-tuple σ = {σ i } i∈N , where σ i ∈ ∆(A i ) denotes the marginal mixed strategy of player i. When a mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆ n (A) is played, we are interested in the expected payoffs which we write as
The notation u i (σ i , σ −i , θ) in (2) is meant to emphasize that the payoff depends on the strategy σ i chosen by player i and the strategies σ −i := {σ j } j∈N ,j =i that are chosen by other players.
Since we want to study games in which θ is uncertain, we further define expected payoffs with respect to a probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(Θ)-we refer to µ as a belief about the state of the world. The expectation of the payoff in (2) with respect to this belief is then given by
The notation u i (σ, µ) in (3) is a slight abuse of the notation u i (σ, θ) in (2) which is itself an slight abuse of u i (a, θ). These inconsistencies are resolved if we use θ to denote a state realization but also as a shorthand for the belief µ with all mass on θ, and use a i and a to denote actions but also as a shorthand for strategies σ i and σ with all mass in a i and a. We adopt this convention henceforth. The payoffs in (3) define a modification of the game Γ(θ) in (1) in which the payoffs are given by the expected utilities in (3) . The equilibria of this modified game are formally defined next.
Definition 1 Given the game Γ(θ) in (1) and a belief µ define the game Γ(µ) = (N , {A i , u i (·, µ)}) associated with the utilities in (3). The joint strategy σ = {σ i } i∈N ∈ ∆ n (A) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(µ) if the utilities in (3) satisfy
The equilibrium is said to be a pure-strategy equilibrium if there exists an action a ∈ A such that σ = a.
The equilibria in (4) exist because the payoffs in (3) define a normal form game with payoffs u i (·, θ)} i∈N . In genreal, pure equilibria may or may not exist, but we will assume here that they do (see Assumption 2) . In such case, identifying pure equilibria is important in applications because they result in behaviors that are often more reasonable than the behaviors that result from mixed equilibria-see Section. Our goal in this paper is to design an algorithm allowing agents learn the pure equilibria in Definition 1 when players play repeatedly over time as they acquire a common belief on the state of the world. We formally state this problem in the following section.
A. Learning via repeated play
We suppose that players are permitted to repeatedly face off in the game Γ(θ) in discrete stages t ∈ N + . At each stage t, agent i plays an action a i,t ∈ A i that is chosen from the possibly mixed strategy σ i,t ∈ ∆(A i ). To select the strategy σ i,t , agent i has access to a belief µ i,t on the state of the world, and has some knowledge of the past history of game play {a j,s } t−1 s=1 , j ∈ N . The beliefs µ i,t ∈ ∆(Θ) are time varying and possibly different for different agents, although they are required to converge to a common distribution-see Assumption 1. Besides this belief on the state of the world, agent i also has estimatesσ i j,t ∈ ∆(A j ) of the strategies σ j,t ∈ ∆(A j ) of other agents. The belief µ i,t and the estimated strategiesσ −i,t := {σ j,t } j∈N ,j =i allow agent i to estimate the payoff that it would receive from playing an arbitrary action a i . These estimated payoffs can be written as [cf. (3)]
The utilityû i,t (a i ) in (5) is what agent i estimates he would receive as payoff given the (partial) information he has available on the state of the world (the belief µ i,t ) and the actions of other agents (the strategy estimatesσ −i,t ). The action that maximizes the utility estimates in (5) is of importance to agent i and defined here as the best responsê
Observe that there may be multiple arguments that maximizê u i,t (a i ). Thus, the best responseâ i,t in (6) is in general a set, not an individual action.
A learning algorithm in game theory is a collection of behavior rules that dictate how each player should choose the "next-stage action" a i,t+1 based on the information they have available at time t. Myopic best response rules in which agents play an action a i,t+1 ∈â i,t are common; see e.g., [7] , [10] , [17] . Here, we are interested in a slight modification in which agents are sometimes "reluctant" to modify their action choices from round to round. We refer to this general algorithm (formally stated next) as inertial best response dynamics.
1
Algorithm 1 Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be an inertia constant and let a i,1 be an arbitrary initial action for each i. At time t > 1, agent i has access to strategy estimatesσ i j,t and a belief µ i,t that it uses to compute the best response setâ i,t in (6). Players follow inertial best response dynamics if they play actions according to
As per (7), an inertial best response algorithm entails player i sticking to its play a i,t with some (fixed) probability ρ (this is the inertia component of the algorithm), and playing a best response otherwise. The selection of myopic best responses promotes a general trend of improving utility, while the inertia component of the algorithm-with its occasional repetition of actions-ensures that players eventually lock into a pure strategy equilibrium. Examples of algorithms that use best response with inertia are available in [9] , [10] .
Throughout this paper, we want to study mechanisms to update the beliefsσ i j,t so that players learn pure equilibria (cf. Definition 1). We do so using fictitious play ideas in whicĥ σ i j,t is built from empirical histograms of the actions that have been observed in the recorded play history. These algorithms are defined in Sections IV and V after we introduce some preliminary convergence results for the generic inertial best response methods given in Algorithm 1.
III. INERTIAL BEST RESPONSE ALGORITHM: GENERAL
CONVERGENCE RESULT In this section we study convergence results for the inertial best response learning dynamics presented in the previous section (see Algorithm 1) . These dynamics can be shown to achieve pure-strategy NE learning so long as the estimated payoffsû i,t satisfy an appropriate asymptotic accuracy condition (see Condition 1) We first present some general assumptions regarding game play, and then present the convergence results.
In later sections, these results will be used to prove convergence of two particular instances of inertial best response dynamics.
A. General Assumptions
We first introduce some notation necessary for the subsequent development. Suppose S is a metric space with Borel σ-algebra Σ, and let {µ t } t≥1 and µ be probability measures on (S, Σ). The sequence {µ t } t≥1 converges weakly to µ if g(s)µ t (ds) → g(s)µ(ds) as t → ∞ for any bounded continuous function g : S → R. In this case we write µ t w − → µ. We assume that players' beliefs on the state of the world converge weakly to a fixed distribution. Formally, Assumption 1 There exists a probability measure µ such that µ In the subsequent development, our focus is aimed at studying learning dynamics and not the particular dynamics used to form the beliefs µ i t . In an effort to maintain this focus, we will not explicitly specify any particular dynamics used to form the belief µ i t -we simply assume that the dynamics used ensure that Assumption 1 is satisfied. In Section VI we present a simulation example in which the dynamics used to form the belief µ i t are explicitly specified and satisfy Assumption 1. Given that there exists a µ such that µ i t w − → µ, for all i, we assume further that under the belief µ, the game is weakly acyclic. Formally, Assumption 2 Let µ be as in Assumption 1 and define the normal form game Γ associated with the belief µ as Γ(µ) = (N , {A i , u i (·, µ)}). We assume the game Γ(µ) is weakly acyclic; that is, for any a ∈ A, there exists a best-response path that converges to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
A review of the topic of weakly acyclic games can be found in [19] . The above assumption ensures that the set of purestrategy NE (see Definition 1) is non-empty, and will ensure that the learning algorithms to be studied can always reach a pure-strategy NE.
Finally, we assume that under the limiting belief µ, players are never indifferent between action choices. Formally,
Assumption 3 For any pair of actions
(cf. [9] Assumption 2.2) Note that Assumption 3 implies that under the belief µ all pure NE are strict. Moreover, the assumption implies that for any i ∈ N and a −i ∈ A −i , the set argmax αi∈Ai u i (α i , a −i , µ) is a singleton.
Assumption 4 Let
{F t } t≥1 be a filtration (sequence of increasing σ-algebras) with
The strategy estimatê σ i j,t ∈ ∆(A j ) that agent i has of the strategy σ j,t of agent j is measurable with respect to F t .
Assumption 4 means that the strategy estimates of agent i are restricted to be a function of the history of play.
The following condition is sufficient (to be shown) to ensure that a FP-type algorithm with inertia converges to NE.
Condition 1 There existt, T ∈ N + such that, if t ≥t, and if any action a ∈ A is repeated consecutively for T > T stages (i.e., a s = a for s = t, . . . , t +T − 1), then
Throughout this section we assume that this condition holds. (In later sections, when studying particular inertial best response algorithms, our main task will be to show that Condition 1 holds.) The condition states that there exists a finite timē t after which if any action profile a is repeated a sufficiently large number of times (specifically, more than T times) then player i's optimal response to its predictions of the utility coincides with the optimal response to the actual action profile a −i . This condition is natural within the class of learning algorithms with fading or finite memory [10] where, if players repeat an action a sufficient number of times their prediction of the utility can be brought arbitrarily close to the utility of the repeatedly-played action.
When studying particular implementations of inertial best response dynamics in the following sections, the condition reduces to tangible assumptions on learning past action profiles of other players-see Conditions 2 and 3.
B. General Convergence Analysis
The following two lemmas allow us to prove the main theoretical result of this section. Lemma 1 shows that purestrategy Nash equilibria are absorbing, and Lemma 2 shows that the probability of reaching such an absorbing state is uniformly bounded from below. Together they prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 (absorption property) Lett be as in Condition 1. Let {a t } t≥1 be a sequence of actions generated by an inertial best response algorithm. Suppose Assumptions 1-4 and Condition 1 hold. There exists a T 1 > 0 such that if t ≥t, and a * ∈ A is any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and if a * is played in T 1 consecutive stages, i.e., a s = a * , for all s = t, . . . , t + T 1 − 1, then a t+τ = a * for all τ ≥ 0.
Proof : Let T be as in Condition 1, and let T 1 > T . Suppose a * is a pure Nash equilibrium and a s = a
Thus, the action a * is repeated in stage t + T 1 . Inductively, we see that a t+τ = a * for all τ ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 (positive probability of absorption) Lett be as in Condition 1. Let {a t } t≥1 be a sequence of actions generated by an inertial best response algorithm. Suppose Assumptions 1-4 and Condition 1 hold. Let T 1 be as in Lemma 1, and let T 2 > T 1 be given. Let t be the current stage of the repeated play. Define the event E t := {a τ = a * for some pure strategy NE a * for all τ ∈ {t , t + 1, . . . , t + T 2 − 1}, for some t ∈ {t, . . . , t + T 2 |A|}}.
There exists an = (T 2 ) > 0 such that P(E t |F t ) > for all t ≥t.
Proof : The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [9] . By Condition 1, for any t ≥t, if any action a ∈ A is repeated consecutively from stage t
Conditioned on F t , the action a 0 will be played repeatedly in T 2 consecutive stages with probability at least 1 := ρ n(T2−1) > 0. Supposing this occurs, then at stage τ = t + T 2 − 1, argmax αi∈Aiûi,τ (α i ) = argmax αi∈Ai u i (α i , a 0 −i , µ) At this point, either no players can improve their utility (in which case we are at a pure NE), or at least one player can improve their utility. If the latter is the case then, conditioned on F t+T2−1 , with probability at least 2 := ρ n−1 (1 − ρ), exactly one player i chooses to take a best response and improves their utility, and all others continue to play a such that a m is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Conditioned on F t , the probability of this action sequence occurring (and then the final action a m being played for T 2 consecutive stages) is bounded from below by := ( 1 2 ) |A| ρ T2−1 .
The lemma establishes that from any state of beliefs and predictions, the probability that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is reached and repeated until absorption is positive. Next, we state our main result for this section.
Theorem 1 Let {a t } t≥1 be a sequence of actions generated by inertial best response dynamics. Suppose Assumptions 1 -4 and Condition 1 hold. Then the action sequence {a t } t≥1 converges to a pure-strategy NE of the game Γ(µ), almost surely. Moreover, let τ be a random variable indicating the round number in which the action sequence converges to a pure-strategy NE. Then E(τ ) < ∞.
Proof: Let t ≥t and let T 2 be as in Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, if a pure NE action a * is played in T 2 consecutive stages, then a * will be played in all consecutive stages. By Lemma 2, the probability of reaching such an "absorbing state" is uniformly lower bounded by some > 0. Thus, the process is absorbed to a pure NE almost surely, and E(τ ) < ∞ ( [20] , p.233).
In the following sections, we will use this result to study the convergence of various instances of inertial best response algorithms in settings with environmental uncertainty and limited communication. In particular our main task will be to show that the algorithms under consideration satisfy Condition 1.
IV. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION OF FICTITIOUS PLAY
WITH INERTIA In this section we study a variation of the classical FP algorithm in which the best response of classical FP is augmented with an inertia term, and interagent communication is restricted to a graph. We refer to the class of algorithms studied in this section as Distributed Fictitious Play (D-FP).
The main contributions of this section are twofold. First, we present the general form of the D-FP algorithm (see Section IV-C); this general algorithm explicitly specifies the learning dynamics to be used, but does not explicitly specify the dynamics of the inter-agent communication scheme. We show that any inter-agent communication scheme will lead to pure-strategy NE learning so long as it satisfies a fairly mild condition (see Condition 2). Subsequently, we present an example implementation of D-FP (see Section IV-E) in which the inter-agent communication scheme is explicitly specified and we demonstrate that the example implementation converges to a pure-strategy NE.
We start by reviewing the centralized FP with fading memory and inertia.
A. Fictitious Play with Inertia and Fading Memory
A review of the classical FP algorithm and FP with inertia can be found in [7] , [10] .
The FP with inertia algorithm is defined as follows. Let Ψ(a i,t ) :
|Ai| denote the weighted empirical distribution (or just empirical distribution) of player i. Formally, let f i,t be defined recursively as f i,1 = Ψ(a i,1 ) and for t ≥ 1,
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a step-size parameter. Let the joint weighted empirical distribution profile (or joint empirical distribution) be given by f t := (f 1,t , . . . , f n,t ). The weighted empirical distribution is said to have "fading memory" because it places greater weight on recent events. 2 In fictitious play with fading memory and inertia, each player chooses their next-stage action according to the rule
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is some predefined inertia constant. 3 In the distributed setting, player i may not have precise
Next, we present the distributed setup and inter-agent communication scheme.
B. Distributed Setup
In a large-scale setting, the physically distributed nature of the system can make it difficult for players to observe the actions taken by every other player. We assume that players may be unable to observe the actions taken by others, but are equipped with a overlaid communication infrastructure through which they may exchange information with neighboring players. Formally, we assume:
Assumption 5 Players are equipped with a pre-assigned communication graph G = (V, E), in which a vertex represents a player and an edge between vertices represents the ability of two players to exchange information. The graph G is strongly connected. Players may exchange information with immediate neighbors (the set of neighbors of a player i is given by N i := {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E}) once between iterations of the repeated play process.
C. General D-FP Algorithm
We now state the general D-FP algorithm. The algorithm follows the format of an inertial best response algorithm, but in this case, the utility prediction of player iû i,t is formed using player i's estimate of the empirical distributionf i −i,t (in particular, this is the product distribution of {f i j,t } j =i ). Intuitively speaking, this may thought of as player i forming the (possibly incorrect) belief that her estimate of the empirical distributionf i −i,t accurately represents the mixed strategies of opponents.
Algorithm 2
with prob. ρ.
(iii) Each player i engages in one round of information exchange with neighboring agents j ∈ N i , and updates their estimate of the joint empirical distributionf i t .
In the following section we analyze convergence of D-FP. We prove convergence to a pure-strategy NE by showing that the algorithm fits the template of Theorem 1.
Remark 1 Note that the framework assumed by Assumptions 1 and 5 may be seen as a strict generalization of the classical repeated play learning framework. The classic framework of centralized and complete information is effectively recovered by letting G be the complete graph and letting µ t i = µ = δ θ for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 1, where δ θ is the Dirac delta distribution placing mass 1 on the point {θ}.
Remark 2 Note that it has not been precisely specified hoŵ f i t is updated. In the following section we give a general sufficient condition on the update rule under which convergence to pure NE can be guaranteed.
D. Convergence Analysis for Generic D-FP Algorithm
We first introduce some notation necessary for the subsequent development. Given metric space (X, d X ) and a family of functions {g α } α∈A with g α : X → R for all α ∈ A we say {g α } α∈A is uniformly equicontinuous if for every > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that |g α (x) − g α (y)| < , for all α ∈ A whenever d X (x, y) < δ, x, y ∈ X.
In order to ensure that weak convergence in beliefs results in a meaningful notion of convergence in terms of players' utility functions, we require that the utility functions satisfy the following assumption: Assumption 6 For each i ∈ N , the family of functions {u i (·, θ)} θ∈Θ is uniformly equicontinuous.
The following lemma allows us to establish the existence of a finite time such that after this time players' beliefs µ i t are sufficiently "close together" for our subsequent analysis.
Lemma 3
The proof of the lemma follows immediately from Lemma 9 in the appendix.
Let
the above lemma implies that there exists a time t η such that, for any σ ∈ ∆ n (A) and any i ∈ N there holds The general form of D-FP (see Section IV-C) explicitly specifies the learning dynamics to be used, but does not explicitly specify the dynamics of the inter-agent communication scheme in step (iii) of the D-FP algorithm. Any protocol for determiningf i t will be valid so long as the following condition is satisfied:
Condition 2 There exists a T > 0 such that if any action a ∈ A is repeated in T > 0 consecutive stages, then f i t −f t < η.
We note that the condition is fairly mild and is attainable by a wide variety of distributed tracking algorithms (e.g. [21] , [22] ). In the following section we present an example implementation of D-FP in which this condition is explicitly satisfied.
The following Lemma shows that if Condition 2 is satisfied, then there exists a time T such that if players repeatedly play an action in T consecutive stages, then the set of maximizers of u i (·,f Lemma 4 Let {a t } t≥1 and {f 1 t , . . . ,f n t } t≥1 be generated according to a D-FP process as defined in Section IV-C, and let {f t } t≥1 be as defined in (8) . Suppose Assumptions 1-6, and Condition 2 hold. Assume t ≥ t η . Then there exists a finite T > 0 such that if any action a * ∈ A is repeatedly played inT ≥ T consecutive stages, i.e., a s = a * for s = t, . . . , t + T , then argmax αi∈Ai u i (α i ,f
The proof of Lemma 4 is found in Appendix A. The preceding lemma ensures that the D-FP process satisfies Condition 1. This allows us to invoke Theorem 1 in order to prove the following theorem, which is in the main convergence result for D-FP.
Theorem 2 Let {a t } t≥1 and {f 1 t , . . . , f n t } t≥1 be generated according to a D-FP process as defined in Section IV-C, and let {f t } t≥1 be as defined in (8) . Suppose Assumptions 5-3 and Condition 2 hold. Then the action sequence {a t } t≥1 converges to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium almost surely.
Proof: The D-FP process fits the template of Condition 1 witĥ u i,t (α i ) = u i (α i ,f −i,t , µ i t ) for each i and each α i ∈ A i . By Lemma 4, the sequence of predictions {u i (α i ,f −i,t , µ i t )} t≥1 satisfies Condition 1. Thus, the result follows from Theorem 1.
In the following section, we present an example implementation of D-FP in which the inter-agent communication scheme is explicitly specified. We demonstrate that the example implementation converges to a pure-strategy NE.
E. An Implementation of D-FP
In this section we provide an example implementation of D-FP in which the mechanism for forming the estimates f i t and the distributed information dissemination scheme are explicitly specified.
Algorithm 3
Initialize (i) Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be fixed. For each i, let a i,1 be chosen arbitrarily, and let the estimatef 
F. An Implementation of D-FP: Convergence Analysis
In this section we analyze the convergence of the example implementation of D-FP presented in Section IV-E.
The following Lemma ensures that Condition 2 is satisfied. It then follows by Theorem 2 that the example implementation of D-FP converges to a pure-strategy NE.
Lemma 5 Let {a t } t≥1 and {f 1 t , . . . ,f n t } t≥1 be generated according to the D-FP process of Section IV-E, and let {f t } t≥1 be as defined in (8) . Suppose Assumptions 5-6 hold. Let W j ∈ R n×n be a weight matrix with the i, kth entry given by W j (i, k) = w i j,k for all j ∈ N . Moreover, let w j j,j > 0. Assume that the matrix W j is row stochastic with sparsity conforming to the communication network G.
For any > 0, there exists T ∈ N + such that if players repeat any action a * ∈ A for T consecutive stages, i.e., a i,s = a * , for s = t, . . . , t + T , then f i t+T − f t+T < .
The proof of Lemma 5 is found in Appendix A. The size of T term in the above lemma depends on the step size parameter α in (8), network structure G and the weights matrices {W j } j∈N . In general, we expect T to be small if the step size is close to 1, 0 α ≤ 1, and the diameter of the network is small. For instance, in a complete network with α = 1 and weights w In the following, we propose a distributed inertial best response algorithm that alleviates the communication and memory overhead within the class of congestion games.
V. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT STRATEGY FICTITIOUS PLAY WITH INERTIA
Joint Strategy FP (JSFP) with inertia-introduced in [9] is a variant of FP developed for large-scale games that has relatively low computational complexity and low information overhead requirements. In this section we study a distributed implementation of JSFP with inertia (referred to hereafter as D-JSFP) for use settings with environmental uncertainty. The algorithms in this section may be seen as instances of inertial best response dynamics.
The variant of JSFP that we study is applicable within the class of congestion games-a subset of the more general class of weakly-acyclic games (see 
A. Congestion Games
Let R = {1, . . . , m} denote a set of resources. For each i, let A i ⊆ 2 R , where 2 R denotes the power set of R. In particular, an action choice a i indicates a subset of resources being utilized by player i.
In a congestion game, the cost associated with using a resource is dependent on the total number of players using the resource. For each r ∈ R, a ∈ A, let σ r (a) ∈ N denote the number of players using resource r under the action profile a. More generally, for a subset of players K ⊆ N , the number of players in K utilizing resource r given {a j } j∈K , is given by σ r ({a j } j∈K ) := j∈K 1(r ∈ a j ).
Given a subset of players K, and a corresponding set of actions {a j } j∈K , we represent the number of players using each resource by σ({a j } j∈K ), where σ is a mapping σ : j∈K A j → N m with the r-th entry in σ({a j } j∈K ) given by σ r ({a j } j∈K ).
For r ∈ R and k ∈ N, let c r (k, θ r ) be the cost associated with using resource r given state θ r , when there are precisely k players simultaneously using the resource. For a i ∈ A i and σ r (a −i ) ∈ N m and state parameter θ := {θ r } r∈R ∈ Θ, let the utility of player i be given by
where we have written σ r (a) = σ r (a −i ) + σ r (a i ) explicitly to emphasize dependence of the utility on "self action" a i and actions of other players a −i . Note that within the class of congestion games, players do not need to precisely know the full action profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A to compute their utility. It is sufficient for each player to have knowledge of σ(a −i ) ∈ N m and their own action a i ∈ A i . In this context, we sometimes express the utility function using the abuse of
In the following, we use this property of the utility functions in congestion games to design the D-JSFP algorithm which has a lower communication overhead than D-FP.
B. D-JSFP Setup
Assume players repeatedly face off in a congestion game. We define ζ i,t (r) to be a (fading-memory) weighted average that tracks the amount of congestion induced on resource r by the actions of (only) player i. In particular, let ζ i,t (r) be defined recursively by ζ i,1 (r) := σ r (a i,1 ), and for t ≥ 1,
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a weight parameter inducing a fadingmemory effect (cf. (8) and subsequent discussion). Furthermore, define ζ i,t ∈ R m to be the vector stacking (ζ i,t (r)) r∈R -this is a vectorized representation of the congestion induced by player i on any given resource.
Define ζ t (r) := j∈N ζ j,t (r)-this represents the congestion induced on resource r by the actions of all players. Note this can also be expressed recursively as ζ t (r) = (1−α)ζ t (r)+ ασ r (a(t)).
Similar to the above, let ζ t be a vector in R m stacking (ζ t (r)) r∈R . We refer to ζ t as the empirical congestion distribution.
In the distributed framework, players may not have precise knowledge of ζ t . Instead, we assume each player i maintains an estimate of ζ t which we denote byζ i t ∈ R m . The r-th term of player i's estimate,ζ i t (r), represents her estimate of the congestion at resource r ∈ R.
Finally, for a vector v ∈ R m define P (v) to be a projection of v onto the set of non-negative m-dimensional integer-valued vectors N m ; formally, for 1 ≤ r ≤ m, let P (v)(r) := z for the unique z ∈ N satisfying z − 
C. General D-JSFP Algorithm
We now state the general D-JSFP algorithm. The algorithm follows the format of an inertial best response algorithm, but in this case, the utility prediction of player iû i,t is formed using player i's estimate of the empirical congestion distributionζ 
Remark 4
The D-JSFP algorithm is closely related to the JSFP algorithm proposed in [9] . In particular, the vector of weighted congestions at each resource ζ t := (ζ t (r)) r∈N is closely related to the empirical frequency of the joint action profile used in the JSFP algorithm. In this case, the vectors ζ t and ζ i,t together may be thought of as a sufficient statistic to compute the expected utility of taking an action that is "close to" the expected utility given the the empirical frequency of the joint action profile of other players. We note that in D-JSFP, the complexity problem associated with FP in large games is mitigated in a different manner than classical JSFP. In classical JSFP, the expected utility is directly tracked using a simple recursion. In our formulation of JSFP, the utility is not directly tracked; instead, players track some "sufficient statistic" ζ −i,t = ζ t − ζ i,t and only evaluate the utility at nearby pure strategies via the projection operation,
D. Convergence Analysis for General D-JSFP Algorithm
The general form described in Section V-C explicitly specifies the learning dynamics to be used, but does not explicitly specify the dynamics of the inter-agent communication scheme. In the following we show that any inter-agent communication scheme will lead to convergence so long as it satisfies the following condition (cf. Condition 2 for D-FP).
Condition 3 There exists a T ≥ 1 (independent of t) such that if any action a * is repeated inT ≥ T consecutive stages then |ζ i t+T
for every r ∈ R. Given Condition 3, we show in the following lemma that if any action a * is repeated in sufficiently many stages, then each player's estimate of the weighted empirical distribution of other playersζ i −i,t may be brought sufficiently close to the congestion profile σ(a * −i ).
Lemma 6 Let {a t } t≥1 and {ζ 1 t , . . . ,ζ n t } t≥1 be generated according to a D-JSFP process as defined in Section V-C, and let {ζ i,t } i∈N ,t≥1 be as defined in (9) . Assume Condition 3 holds. There exists a T ≥ 1 (independent of t) such that if any action a * is repeated inT ≥ T consecutive stages then |ζ
Proof: LetT ≥ 0 and note that
By C.3, we may choose T such that forT ≥ T there holds |ζ i t+T (r) − σ r (a)| < The next lemma shows that if any action a * is repeated in sufficiently many stages then the utility generated by the projection of a player's estimate of the empirical distribution may be brought sufficiently close to the utility generated by the action a * , so that the respective sets of maximizers coincide. Indeed, this lemma allows us to show that D-JSFP fits the template of an inertial best response algorithm and in particular that C.1 is satisfied.
Lemma 7 Let {a t } t≥1 and {ζ 1 t , . . . ,ζ n t } t≥1 be generated according to a D-JSFP process as defined in Section V-C, and let {ζ i,t } i∈N ,t≥1 be as defined in (9) . Suppose Assumptions 1-5 and Condition 3 hold. There exists a T ≥ 1 (independent of t) such that if any action a * is repeated inT ≥ T consecutive stages then argmax αi∈Ai u i (α i , P (ζ
Proof : Let T be chosen as in Lemma 6 so that |ζ
Moreover, there exists a timet such that for t +T ≥t there holds
. This is a consequence of Assumption 1 and the fact that u i is continuous and bounded, and that A −i is a finite set. By setting T = max{t, T } we get the desired result.
In the following theorem we combine the results above with Theorem 1 to prove that the D-JSFP algorithm converges to the a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3 Let {a t } t≥1 and {ζ 1 t , . . . , ζ n t } t≥1 be generated according to a D-JSFP process as defined in Section IV-C, and let {ζ t } t≥1 be as defined in (9) . Suppose Assumptions 1-5 and Condition 3 hold. Then the action sequence {a t } t≥1 converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, almost surely.
Proof :
The process fits the template of Theorem 1, with
for each i and each α i ∈ A i . By Lemma 7, the sequence {u i (α i , P (ζ i −i,t ), µ i t )} t≥1 satisfies C.1 for each α i ∈ A i . The result then follows from Theorem 1.
E. An Implementation of D-JSFP
In this section we provide an example implementation of D-JSFP in which the mechanism for forming the estimatê ζ i t , and the distributed information dissemination scheme are explicitly specified. The algorithm is as follows:
For each player i, the next-stage action is chosen according to the rule
(iii) Update ζ i,t+1 according to (9) . Shareζ i t + ζ i,t+1 − ζ i,t with neighbors. (iv) Each player i updates their estimate of ζ t as:
where w
We remark that in D-JSFP players only share a vector with |R| integer values with their neighbors where |R| is the cardinality of the set of resources. In comparison, in the D-FP algorithm players share their estimate of each agent's empirical frequency implying that they share n×|R| values at each step.
F. Convergence Analysis of Example Implementation of D-JSFP
The following lemma shows that the distributed information tracking scheme used to form the estimatesζ i t (see step (iii) in Section V-E) satisfies Condition 3 given an appropriate assumption on players' weights w i k . It then follows by Theorem 3 that the given implementation of D-JSFP converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 8 Let {a t } t≥1 and {ζ 1 t , . . . , ζ n t } t≥1 be generated according to a D-JSFP process as defined in Section V-E, and let {ζ t } t≥1 be as defined in (9) . Assume Assumption 5 holds. Let W j ∈ R n×n be a weight matrix with the i, kth entry given by W j (i, k) = w i j,k for all j ∈ N . Assume that the matrix W is doubly stochastic. There exists aT ≥ 1 (independent of t) such that if any action a * is repeated inT ≥ T consecutive stages then |ζ i t+T
The proof of Lemma 8 is similar to the proof of Lemma 5, and is omitted here for brevity.
VI. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We consider the congestion game defined in Section V-A. We assume each agent can only pick a single route at each time A i = R. The cost of route r ∈ R is quadratic in the number of players on that route,
where φ r , β r , κ r are route specific constants which play the role of the unknown state of the world.
In the numerical setup, we let φ r = 1/(1+2(r−1)), β r = 1 and κ r = 1 for each route. Agents implement the D-JSFP algorithm defined in Section V-E. We let the fading constant α and the inertia probability ρ be 0.1 and 0.3, respectively. Players are uncertain about κ r and φ r . Each player receives a single initial signal on κ r and φ r for each r ∈ R. The signals on κ r come from the uniform distribution in [0.75, 1.25] . The signals on φ r come from the uniform distribution in [φ r − 0.25, φ r + 0.25]. Following each round of game play, players exchange their mean estimates of the state parameters κ r and φ r with neighbors, and form new estimates using a weighted average consensus recursion.
In this simple example, the µ i t are deterministic delta distributions, as is the limit distribution µ. As noted in Section III, this achieves weak convergence of the beliefs, thus satisfying Assumption 1. Moreover, Assumption 1 could also be satisfied by analogously generating a sequence of random delta distributions using consensus recursions that ensure almost sure convergence of the estimates [23] - [25] .
There are n = 10 agents and m = 3 routes. The connection among agents is determined by a geometric network. Agents are randomly placed on a two dimensional space (5 units × 5 units) and two agents are connected if their distance is less than a given threshold value (2 units). In Fig. 1 we plot the number of vehicles on each route. In Fig. 2 we plot the congestion cost at each road and total congestion cost over time. We initialize all agents' actions to be route 1. We observe that at equilibrium connection threshold (units) there are four agents on roads 2 and 3, and two agents on road 1. Total congestion cost diminishes significantly in the first few time steps -see Fig. 2 . At equilibrium we observe that congestion cost at road 2 is slightly higher than the other roads. Next, we analyze convergence times with respect to initial level of uncertainty on the state parameters κ r and φ r , and network connectivity. In particular we use distance thresholds 2, 2.5, 3 and 3.5 to generate four geometric networks with diameters 4, 3, 2 and 2 and with average lengths 2, 1.3, 1.2 and 1.1, respectively. For each network, we make 50 runs with and without uncertainty on the state parameters. The average convergence time of the D-JSFP algorithm is reported in Table I . We observe convergence time tends to decrease as the connection threshold increases. We do not see a significant difference between the convergence times when there is uncertainty or not about the state parameters.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied inertial best response dynamics for learning pure-strategy NE in distributed multi-agent systems with uncertainty. A pure strategy NE implies that agents take optimal actions with respect to the actions of the other agents. Subsequently, we studied two important cases of inertial best response dynamics (FP, and JSFP); we derived distributed variants of both algorithms, derived sufficient conditions for convergence, and provided explicit example implementations. Finally, results were corroborated with simulation examples in congestion games. 
APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
The following lemma studies a uniform convergence property for families of equicontiuous functions. The lemma is applied in the text to prove that given weak convergence of beliefs (see A.1) and equicontinuity of utilities (see A.6) Lemma 3 holds.
Lemma 9 Let Θ be as defined in Section II. Let X be a compact subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. Let g : X × Θ → R be bounded. Assume that for each x ∈ X the function g(x, ·) : Θ → R is Borel measurable. Furthermore, assume that the family of functions {g(·, θ)} θ∈Θ is uniformly equicontinuous. Let (µt) t≥1 and µ be probability measures on (Θ, B(Θ)) such that µt w − → µ. For any > 0 there exists T > 0 such that for all t ≥ T there holds
Proof : Let > 0. Since the family of functions {g(·, θ)} θ∈Θ is equicontinuous, there exists a δ > 0 such that if x, y ∈ X and x − y < δ then |g(x, θ) − g(y, θ)| < 3 for any θ ∈ Θ. Since X is a compact subset of Euclidean space we may choose a finite set {xn} Since µt converges weakly to µ, and the set {xn} N n=1 is finite, and the function g(x , ·) is measurable for each x ∈ {xn} N n=1 , there exists a T > 0 such that
Choose an arbitrary x ∈ X. There exists ax ∈ {xn} N n=1 such that x ∈ B δ (x). In particular, note that
and likewise,
Using the triangle inequality and applying the estimates derived above gives,
The following is a proof of Lemma 4 in Section IV-D. Proof (Lemma 4): We first show that for every ξ > 0, there exists a finite T > 0 such that if any action a * ∈ A is repeatedly played in T ≥ T consecutive stages, i.e., as = a * for s = t, . . . , t + T , then f i t+T − Ψ(a * ) < ξ, for all i. Let ξ > 0 be given. By the triangle inequality,
. Thus it is sufficient to choose T sufficiently large so that
and ft − Ψ(a * ) < ξ 2 , for all t ≥ T .
Claim there exists a finite T 1 > 0 such that if any action a * is repeated in T 1 consecutive stages, then f t+T 1 − Ψ(a * ) < ξ 2
. This follows immediately from the observation that, for all i, and for any τ ∈ {1, 2, . . .} there holds fi,t+τ = α(1 − (1 − α) τ −1 )Ψ(a * i ) + (1 − α) τ fi,t. By C.2 there exists a T 2 such that if any action a * is repeated for T > T 2 consecutive stages, then f i t+T − ft+T < ξ 2
. Let T = max(T 1 , T 2 ) and note that for t ≥ T , (11) holds.
We now move to prove the statement in the Theorem. Note that under C.2, there exists a compact C such that for each player i the belieff i t belongs to C for all t. For each i, ui(·, ·) (as defined in (3)) is multilinear in the first argument. Hence, it is locally Lipschitz continuous in the first argument; i.e., given the belief µ there exists a finite Ki > 0 such that for any p , p ∈ C there holds |ui(p , µ) − ui(p , µ)| ≤ Ki p − p . Let K := max{Ki : i ∈ N }.
Since the action space is finite, A.3 implies there exists an > 0 such that for all i ∈ N there holds |ui(a i , a−i, µ)−ui(a i , a−i, µ)| > for all a i , a i ∈ Ai, a i = a i a−i ∈ A−i. Let ξ < 4K . Applying the claim demonstrated in the beginning of the proof there exists a T > 0 such that if any action a * ∈ A is repeated inT ≥ T consecutive stages, then f i t+T − Ψ(a * ) < ξ, for all i.
Let {a i } = argmax α i ∈A i ui(αi, a * −i , µ) (by Remark 3, the best response to any pure strategy is a singleton), and note that ui(a i , a * −i , µ) − > ui(a i , a * −i , µ)
for all a i ∈ Ai, a i = a i . Furthermore, for τ = t +T ,T ≥ T , there holds by Lipschitz continuity of ui(·, µ),
for all ai ∈ Ai. In particular, for {a i } = argmax α i ∈A i ui(αi, a * −i , µ) and for any a i ∈ Ai satisfying a i = a i there holds, |ui(a i ,f The result follows as a corollary to Lemma 10 in the appendix. Let fi,t(a) ∈ [0, 1] be the weight assigned to an action a ∈ Ai by the empirical distribution of i at time t. We use the similar notationf i j,t (a) to denote the estimate distribution for action a ∈ Aj.
Let |Aj| indicate the cardinality of the action space of player j.
Let ξ > 0 be such that ξ < n j=1 |Aj| −1
. Consider an arbitrary player j and action aj ∈ Aj. Suppose the action a * j ∈ Aj (a * j not necessarily equal to aj) is repeated in T consecutive stages, where T > 0 is arbitrary. We wish to analyze the behavior of the sequence (fj,t+τ (aj)) τ ≥0 in order to show that it fits the template of Lemma 10. We may break the analysis into two cases: Case 1 (aj = a * j ): ft+τ (aj) monotonically approaches 0 as τ → T . In particular, since ft+τ (aj) ∈ [0, 1], then the monotonicity implies that 
APPENDIX B DISTRIBUTED AVERAGING IN DYNAMIC NETWORKS
Consider a network of N nodes connected through a communication graph G = (V, E). The graph is assumed to be strongly connected. Let t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, and let xj(t) ∈ R denote the value at node j at time t. The objective is for all nodes to track as closely as possible the value xj(t) held by node j. Let |xj(t + 1) − xj(t)| = j (t), and | (t) = maxj j (t) and assume that:
